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Insolvency Law:
Gaps
Philip Smart and Charles D Booth argue that poor drafting in
Hong Kong's new insolvency law leaves many issues open to
challenge
C orporate and insolvency lawpractitioners will be aware that
on a number of occasions in recent
years poor legislative drafting has
resulted in defective amendments
being made to the Companies
Ordinance (Cap 32). This problem has
recently reared its head again, most
notably in Re Setaffa Investments Ltd
[1998] 2 HKLRD 236 (Le Pichon J). As
in previous examples, the difficulties
revealed in the Setaffa case were
created because the draftsman, when
in effect copying UK legislation, did
not do a thorough enough job and
failed to copy fully the UK legislation.
As Le Pichon J noted (at 246), such an
oversight would 'hardly be the first
time that it will have occurred when
Hong Kong legislation is modelled on
UK legislation.' The purpose of this
article is threefold: (1) to note the
decision in Setaffa; (2) to identify a
number of other areas in the new
insolvency legislation where similar
problems have occurred; and (3) to
bring to practitioners' attention a
practical d i f f icul ty concerning the
extraterritoriality of the new avoidance
powers that have recently been
incorporated into the insolvency
legislation.
Setaffa and Post-Liquidation
Interest
Major amendments to Hong Kong's
insolvency regime were made in the
Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance
1996 (Ord No 76 of 1996) (the BAO),
which finally came into operation on
1 April 1998 (LN 158 of 1998). One
issue dealt with in the B AO is interest
on debts in a bankruptcy. However,
reform of the law on interest on debts
in relation to a solvent liquidation was
introduced directly into the
Companies Ordinance by the
Companies (Amendment) Ordinance
1997 (the CAO), which came into
operation on 10 February 1997 (Ord
No 3 of 1997). The CAO introduced a
new s 264A into the Companies
Ordinance. This section deals inter alia
with interest on debts, in the post-
l iqu ida t ion period, owed by a
company that is not insolvent.
Subsection (2) provides that '[a]ny
surplus remaining after the payment
of debts proved in a winding up' of a
company which is not an insolvent
company:
'... shall, before being applied for
any other purpose, be applied in
paying interest on those debts in
respect of the period during
which the debt has been
outstanding, in the case of ...
(b) a voluntary winding up, since
the commencement of the
winding up .,.'
It goes without saying that s 264A will
be applicable where the liquidation has
commenced after 10 February 1997.
The issue raised in Setaffa, however,
was whether the section operated in
relation to a winding up commenced
prior to that date.
In Setaffa the winding up had begun
many years previously (in fact as long
ago as 1983), but there remained a
substantial sum of money which had
not been distributed at the time s 264A
came into operation. It was argued that
s 264A could be given a partially
retrospective operation by applying it
to distributions taking place after
10 February 1997. The reason why this
argument, however unlikely it may
appear, could even be advanced is
because although s 264A(2) is taken
almost verbatim from the Insolvency
Act 1986 (UK) (s 189 thereof), the
draftsman in Hong Kong failed to copy
the relevant transitional provisions.
These provisions, contained in the 1986
Act, Sch 11, para 4(1), provide:
'In relation to any winding up
which has commenced, or is
treated as having commenced,
before the appointed day, the new
law does not apply, and the
former law continues to have
effect.. . '
Clearly, some such transitional
provision ought to have been made in
the CAO. The failure to do so, which
as Le Pichon J suggested (at 246) may
have been 'attributable to sheer
oversight', led to (what should have
been) quite unnecessary litigation. On
the facts in Setaffa, the court rejected
the contention that s 264A had any
retrospective effect. For in the absence
of any express language or clear
indication suggesting retroactivity, the
section only applied to liquidations
commenced after 10 February 1997.
Transitional Problems and
Avoidance Powers
Under s 99 of the BAO (unlike the
CAO) there is a general transitional
provision which, in effect, provides
that where a bankruptcy case had
a l r e a d y commenced pr ior to
the coming into effect of the BAO
(ie 1 April 1998) the 'old law' will
continue to apply to that case (subject
to certain important exceptions in
relation to the discharge of bankrupts).
Thus, if we turn to the avoidance
powers of a trustee in bankruptcy,
there can be no doubt that if, for
example, the bankruptcy commenced
on 1 March 1998, then the old law on
f raudulen t preference will be
applicable should the trustee seek to
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set aside a payment made by the
bankrupt on 1 January 1998. In other
words, as in Setaffa, the new law is not
retrospective. But, one may ask, what
of the situation where the bankruptcy
is commenced after 1 April 1998 — so
s 99 of the BAO is not applicable —
but the transaction sought to be
impeached was entered into prior to
that date? The trap is to assume that,
because the case commenced after
1 April 1998, the new provisions will
apply.
The way this issue was specifically
resolved in the Insolvency Act 1986
(UK) was to have a special transitional
provision relating to avoidance
powers (see para 17 in Sch 11 to the
1986 Act). That provision stated that a
transaction occurring before the
appointed day would only be avoided
under the new statutory provisions to
the extent that such a transaction could
have been avoided under the old
legislation. The advantage of this
approach is that it puts the focus on
the new provisions but, at the same
time, prevents any unfairness by
not allowing the new provisions to
apply where the transaction was
unimpeachable (under the old law) at
the time it was entered into.
In Hong Kong, however, the
draftsman has not copied para 17. As
a result, as with the Setaffa case, there
is no expressly applicable statutory
provision in the amending legislation.
Nevertheless, basic principles tell us
that, in the absence of an express
provision or a clear indication, the new
avoidance powers cannot be regarded
as applying to transactions taking
place prior to 1 April 1998. If it were
otherwise, a transaction that was
perfectly valid and unimpeachable at
the time it was entered into might
subsequently become voidable. If, as
suggested here, the new avoidance
powers do not apply, then does the
old law continue to operate in respect
of such transactions? In light of s 23 of
the Interpretation and General Clauses
Ordinance (Cap 1), the answer is in
the af f i rmat ive . Hence, the old
avoidance provisions, even though
they have been repealed by the BAO,
must continue to be applied in relation
to transactions occurring before 1 April
1998 despite the f ac t that the
bankruptcy proceedings only
commence after that date.
In summary, practitioners should
be aware that the new avoidance
powers in bankruptcy cases are not
retrospective and, moreover, that the
old provisions continue to apply
to events and transactions occurring
prior to 1 April 1998 even where the
b a n k r u p t c y was only in f a c t
commenced after 1 April 1998. Thus,
practitioners had better keep copies of
the old provisions for some years to
come.
Our only observation is
that the total
non-discussion of this
important topic by the
appropriate law reform
body is a peculiar way
of conducting a law
reform exercise
Unfair Preferences under the
Companies Ordinance
The BAO not only introduced new
avoidance powers in bankruptcy, it
also added a new unfair preference
prov i s ion to the Companies
Ordinance. Section 266B contains the
following transitional provision:
'(2) Where the winding up of a
company commences before the
amending Ordinance comes into
operation, the provisions of the
principal Ordinance [that is, the
Bankruptcy Ordinance] as it
existed before being amended by
the amending Ordinance apply in
respect of sections 266 and 266A
of this Ordinance.'
Hence, s 266B(2) expressly provides
that where a winding up commences
before 1 April 1998, the new unfair
preference provision does not apply.
The effect, therefore, is that the old
fraudulent preference provision
(found in the old bankruptcy
legislation) remains applicable.
Section 266B(2) however does not
address the situation where, for
example, the winding up commenced
on 1 May 1998 but the alleged
preference occurred on 1 January 1998.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt
that s 266B has no retrospective effect
whatsoever: events taking place before
1 April 1998 continue to be governed
by the old law on fraudulent
preference.
Extraterritoriality: Amendment
of Insolvency Rules Required
As has been noted, the new avoidance
powers under the BAO are based
largely on the equivalent English
provisions (see ss 339 et seq of the
Insolvency Act 1986). In recent years
the English courts have consistently
maintained that these English
avoidance powers may operate
extraterritorially (see Re Paramount
Airways Ltd (in admin) [1993] Ch 223
and generally, P Smart, Cross-Border
Insolvency (2nd Ed, 1998), pp 17-27.
Note the same view is taken in England
in relation to the public examination
of a director of an insolvent company
(see Re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd
[1993] Ch 345). Having regard to the
ancestry of the BAO provisions, it is
very likely, if not inevitable, that the
Court of First Instance would take the
same approach in relation to the new
Hong Kong avoidance powers. This
would represent a change to the pre-
April 1998 position, where avoidance
powers were generally taken to be
territorial in nature (see obiter in
American Express International Banking
Corpn v Johnson [1984] HKLR 372).
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Obviously, in light of the realities of
global business, there is every reason
to expect present-day avoidance
powers to be c o n s t r u e d as
extraterritorial.
It is unfortunate that insolvency
practitioners do not have the benefit
of the views of the Hong Kong Law
Reform Commission or its Insolvency
Sub-Committee on the question of the
extraterritoriality of the new avoidance
powers. It is quite startling to realise
that, despite the obvious significance
of avoidance powers in bankruptcy,
no discussion of avoidance powers is
found in either of the two law reform
documents relating to bankruptcy. The
Law Reform Commission, and its Sub-
Committee on Insolvency, simply did
not address avoidance powers at all in
these documents. Nevertheless, the UK
provisions found their way into the
Bankruptcy (Amendment) Bill 1996
and from there into the BAO. These
commentators are happy to see new,
more powerful avoidance powers
c o n f e r r e d upon t rus tees and
liquidators in Hong Kong insolvencies.
Our only observation is that the total
non-discussion of this important topic
by the appropriate law reform body is
a peculiar way of conducting a law
reform exercise.
It is perhaps tempting to overlook
the process followed and focus on the
end result. Hong Kong trustees and
liquidators now have stronger
avoidance powers and these powers
are, it seems, extraterritorial. However,
if what the draftsman was trying to
achieve (as one must assume) was to
confer the same avoidance jurisdiction
upon a Hong Kong trustee and the
Hong Kong court as is possessed by
their English counterparts, then that
objective has not been met. For when
the substantive law was changed in
England in the mid-1980s, new
procedural rules were introduced in
the form of the Insolvency Rules 1986.
Specifically, r 12.12(3) leaves it entirely
to the discretion of the court as to the
manner in which any process or order
of the court in insolvency proceedings
is to be served on any person who is
not in England. Thus, the position in
England is that: (1) the Insolvency Act
1986 avoidance powers are
extraterritorial in scope; and (2) a
person outside the jurisdiction can be
served with process by reliance upon
the express wording of r 12.12 of the
Insolvency Rules 1986 (for a recent
illustration involving insolvent
trading, see Re Howard Holdings Inc
[1998] BCC 549 and P Smart, supra
pp 26-27). However, in Hong Kong,
although the new avoidance powers
are copied from the UK provisions, no
equivalent to r 12.12 has been
introduced into either the Companies
(Winding-up) Rules or the Bankruptcy
Rules (even though extensive
amendments were made to the
Bankruptcy Rules as from 1 April 1998
(Bankruptcy (Amendment) Rules 1998
(LN 77 of 1998)). The net result is that,
although the new avoidance powers
are extraterritorial, most practical
benefits that might have flowed from
extraterritoriality have evaporated
because of what was presumably an
oversight in not making appropriate
p r o c e d u r a l p r o v i s i o n in the
Bankruptcy Rules and the Companies
(Winding-up) Rules.
Conclusion
The Setaffa decision puts to rest any
suggestion that reference to this sort
of legislative drafting error is mere
quibbling. The failure to adequately
copy UK legislation creates uncertainty
and invites unnecessary litigation. To
avoid similar confusion as to the
operation of the new avoidance
powers, it would be helpful if the
Government Printer were to include
copies of both the old and new
provisions in the next edition of the
inserts for the Bankruptcy and
Companies Ordinances. Finally, it is
also important that amendments be
made to the subsidiary legislation as
soon as possible to enable trustees and
liquidators to benefit from the
extraterr i tor ial i ty of their new
avoidance powers.
Philip Smart and Charles D Booth
teach insolvency law at the
University of Hong Kong
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